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Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case 
ANITA L. ALLEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The public is divided over what, if anything, constitutes an acceptable sur­
rogate-parenting arrangement. 1 Family planners, adoption professionals, at­
torneys, legislators, and judges are debating the moral and legal status of 
trading parental rights for cash. The lack of accord is radical. The issues are 
seemingly intractable. 
Normative debates about surrogacy sometimes depict it as a novel, sui 
generis problem of bioethics and contemporary values. But more often, the 
debates proceed as a search for agreement about the paradigms of social ex­
perience to which surrogacy-related roles and transactions are properly anal­
ogized.2  Astonishingly, the proffered analogies equate surrogacy with the 
most sacred modes of human association and the most profane. One is asked 
to decide: Is the surrogate mother more akin to wet nurse or slave? Is she 
entrepreneur or victim? Are the men who purchase surrogacy services fa­
thers or mere sperm donors? Are the childless men and women who seek to 
overcome the limitations of their anatomies employers or exploiters? Is the 
company or lawyer in the business of facilitating surrogacy a true friend of 
family life or a parasitic profiteer? Are surrogacy agreements legally binding 
commercial contracts or unenforceable commitments?3 
The Baby M case has been a dramatic high point of the surrogate-parent-
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1974, New College; 
M.A. 1976, Ph.D. 1979, University of Michigan; J.D . 1984, Harvard University. 
1. [S]urrogate mothering is now practiced when the female partner of a couple is infertile. 
A couple contracts with another woman, who agrees to be artifically inseminated with the 
husband's semen, to bear the child, and then to relinquish it at birth to be reared by the 
couple. The surrogate provides both the ovum and a uterine environment in order to 
enable the infertile couple to rear a child of the husband's blood. 
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 405, 422 (1983). 
In principle, surrogates' collaborators need not be couples and need not be married. The female 
seeking the aid of a surrogate need not be sterile, infertile, or disabled. In Baby M, medical dangers 
associated with multiple sclerosis were judged too severe by Elizabeth and William Stem to risk 
pregnancy. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 337, 525 A.2d 1128, 1139 ( 1 987), a.lf'd in part, rev'd 
in part, remanded, 1 09 N.J . 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). Hereinafter , the trial court opinion will be 
cited as Baby M, I and the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion as Baby M, II. 
2. The utility of the second approach is questionable. See R. UNGER, THE HISTORY OF THE 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8 ( 1986) ("Because everything can be defended, nothing 
can; the analogy-mongering must be brought to a halt."). 
3. At least four states, Louisiana, Nebraska, Indiana, and Kentucky, have enacted legislation 
prohibiting the enforcement of surrogacy contracts. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 6, 21, 
col. 1. The National Conference of State Legislatures reports that sixteen states have introduced 
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ing phenomenon. The New Jersey Supreme Court dealt commercial surro­
gacy a sharp blow when it unanimously reversed Superior Court Judge 
Sorkow's startling holding that the constitutional privacy rights of childless 
couples demand state validation and specific enforcement of surrogacy agree­
ments.4 Judge Sorkow's opinion had championed a state-enforced right to 
utilize surrogacy as a constitutionally protected privacy right. 5  Writing for 
the New Jersey high court, Chief Justice Wilentz countered that a natural 
father seeking exclusive custody has no coherent procreative privacy claim 
against his child's natural, though surrogate, mother. 6 
Does due regard for constitutional privacy mandate legal validation and 
enforcement of surrogacy agreements? Even before Baby M, this important 
question had been broached-sometimes directly, sometimes obliquely-by a 
handful of state courts7 and a flock of law review commentators.8 A few of 
these answered as Judge Sorkow answered-inadequately and wrongly in the 
bills regulating surrogacy this year and eighteen states have introduced or carried forward bills from 
1987 to prohibit surrogacy contracts. /d. at I, col. 6. 
4 .  Baby M, II, 1 09 N.J. at 4 1 1 ,  537 A.2d at 1 234 . 
5. Baby M, I, 2 1 7  N.J. Super. at 338, 525 A.2d at 1 1 68 .  
6. Baby M, II, 1 09 N.J .  at 448, 537 A.2d at  1 254 . 
7. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs. ,  Inc. v .  Kentucky ex rei. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 2 1 2  
(Ky. 1 986) (surrogacy held not to violate Kentucky statute prohibiting buying and selling of ba­
bies); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J. ,  132 Misc.2d 972, 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d 8 13 ,  8 1 7  (Sur. 1 986) 
(surrogacy agreement not expressly prohibited by legislature and therefore allowed despite court's 
strong rese rvations); Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 1 69 ,  1 74 ,  307 N.W.2d 438,  44 1 ( 1 98 1 )  (state 
statute subjecting to court scrutiny any exchange of consideration in adoption proceedings, other 
than court costs, held not to violate constitutional right to privacy, and Michigan statutes prohibit­
ing payment to surrogate mothers held constitutionally permissible), cert. denied, 459 U.S.  1 1 83 
( 1 983). 
8 .  See, e.g., Bitner, Womb for Rent: A Call for Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and Regulat­
ing Surrogate Parenting Agreements, 90 DICK. L. REV. 227, 236-237 ( 1 985) (woman has constitu­
tional privacy right to become surrogate); Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 1 0  AM. 
J.L. E MED. 243, 256 ( 1 985) (courts should construe surrogacy contracts as revocable prenatal 
agreements allowing natural mother to keep child if she chooses, and should prohibit commercial 
surrogacy contracts); Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for 
Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 7 1 ,  82 ( 1 982) (surrogacy agreement may work an estoppel against 
natural mother); Robertson, supra note I, at 420 (judicially defining and articulating scope of right 
to procreative privacy would set court adrift in largely uncharted waters); Smith and I raola, Sexual­
ity, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 263, 285 ( 1984) (discussing married and un­
married women's rights to artificial insemination); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: the Outer Limits of 
Protected Conduct, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1 13 1 ,  1 14 1  ( 1 986) [hereinafter Note, Surrogate Motherhood: 
the Outer Limits] (criticizing Doe v. Kelley); Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A 
Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J . 1 283, 1284 n.5 ( 1 985) [hereinafter Note, 
Developing a Concept] (proposing adoption of comprehensive surrogate parenthood statute); Note, 
Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1 936, 
194 1 -49 ( 1 986) [hereinafter Note ,  Rumpelstiltskin Revisited] (assessing theoretical justifications for 
limiting alienability and rejecting paternalism analysis in favor of theory of centrality to values of 
personhood). 
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affirmative.9 Judge Sorkow's constitutional privacy arguments are problem­
atic for three main reasons. 
First, and of central concern here, Sorkow's arguments purported to vali­
date surrogacy agreements by appeal to the procreative and parental privacy 
rights of a childless man or couple. Before adopting the view that these pri­
vacy rights entitle childless men or couples to the enforcement of surrogacy 
contracts, one must examine the competing constitutional perspective that 
the surrogate's procreative and parental privacy rights validate or invalidate 
surrogacy agreements. 10 
This competing perspective undercuts the "breach of contract" rationale 
on which Judge Sorkow relied for specifically enforcing irrevocable surro­
gacy agreements against recalcitrant surrogate mothers. For, to the extent 
that one views privacy rights as fundamental and surrogacy arrangements as 
the exercise of a woman's procreative and parental privacy rights, one also 
should view a surrogate's power to alienate her privacy rights by contract as 
potentially limited. 1 1 Arguably, the state-imposed limitation on alienability 
9. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7; Cohen, supra note 8; Coleman, supra note 8; Note, Surrogate 
Motherhood: the Outer Limits, supra note 8.  
1 0. See Bitner, supra note 8 ,  at 236-37 (woman has constitutional privacy right to become 
surrogate). 
1 1 . A central question raised by surrogacy is whether paternalistic (or other) grounds exist for 
treating fundamental procreative and parental privacy rights as commercially inalienable; or, if  not, 
as alienable subject to limitation by a mother's post-natal right to change her mind. I contend that 
while the Baby M courts made constitutional privacy arguments, they paid insufficient attention to 
the alienability of such rights. 
In the present context, "privacy" refers to an aspect of liberty. In liberal jurisprudence, norms of 
individual autonomy or self-determination are commonly said to underlie liberty's (and hence pri­
vacy's) value. See Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 
58 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 44 5, 467-69 ( 1 983) (discussing the alienability of autonomy by positing 
hypothetical situation of voluntary slavery). In constitutional law, fundamental liberties including 
rights of privacy, protect what the United State Supreme Court deems to be our most important 
legally protectable interests. 
Whether persons are at liberty to alienate fundamental liberties is a well-recognized conundrum. 
Feinberg is one of the only theorists to have addressed this puzzle in the context of constitutional 
privacy. See generally id. at 467-83 (discussing the alienability of the autonomous person's right to 
self-government); see also Part I I I-B of this article, infra. Feinberg's focus, however, was exceed­
ingly general and his examples-voluntary slavery contracts and agreements to forego wealth­
unrealistic. Nevertheless, his analysis of competing rationales, including paternalistic rationales, for 
limiting the alienability of fundamental rights is helpful. 
Interference with the voluntary, self-regarding acts of a competent adult is often described as 
immoral paternalism, even when the interference is intended to further some defensible conception 
of that person's best interest. See generally J. FEINBERG, HARM FROM SELF ( 1 98 6) (liberal theo­
ries of justified paternalism); D. VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION ( 198 6) (same). 
Thus, paternalistic laws have been criticized as immorai and inconsistent with the liberal conception 
of government. 
Paternalism interests philosophers chiefly because of the simultaneously appealing and unappeal­
ing supposition that the highest regard for humanity requires that individuals be permitted to harm 
their own interests, so long as they act voluntarily and do not harm others. Cf Brock, Paternalism 
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most consistent with a surrogate's procreative and parental liberty is one that 
invalidates her promises to abrogate custody and other parental rights unless 
these promises are subject to postnatal revocation. A state-imposed limita­
tion of this sort would restrict contractual liberty, while expanding the surro­
gate's opportunities for effective reconsideration. 
The second problem faced by Judge Sorkow's arguments for the validity of 
commercial surrogacy agreements relates to the first. He assumed that pa­
rental rights can be alienated prior to conception and childbirth. This as­
sumption is shared by others, averse to paternalistic limitations on 
alienability, who maintain that among the fundamental privacy rights is a 
woman's freedom to hire herself out as a surrogate mother. 1 2 But if any 
privacy rights are constitutionally protected, parental privacy rights are. 
One cannot rightly conclude that prenatal agreements intending irrevocably 
to terminate parental rights are valid without first considering whether 
grounds exist for limiting the alienability of constitutional postnatal parental 
privacy rights. The highest respect for values of personal security might be 
such grounds. 1 3  
Third, the moral criticism engendered by commercial surrogacy casts a 
cloud over Judge Sorkow's constitutional privacy arguments. To be sure, 
privacy rights are workable and working components of the constitutional 
framework. However, privacy jurisprudence cannot be manipulated to ac­
commodate every purpose related to reproduction and families. 1 4 To illus­
trate with extreme examples, constitutional privacy is no normative 
sanctuary for those who abuse children, rape their wives, or beat their 
spouses. Similarly, surrogacy inflicts emotional and dignitarian injuries and 
inevitably represents the "commodification" of human life and reproduc­
tion.15 Like commercial adoption, it turns human infants into a precious 
commodity. Whether a parent agrees before or after childbirth to terminate 
and Autonomy, 98 ETHICS 550 ,  5 5 1  ( 1 988) ("there are two central values [au tonomy and individual 
well-being] at stake which in hard cases are in conflict and so must be balanced or traded off"). 
12 .  !d. For a discussion of restrictions on surrogacy as state paternalism, see generally Note, 
Rumpelstiltskin Revisited, supra note 8. 
1 3 .  See Note, R umpelstiltskin Revisited, supra note 8,  at 1 94 1 -49 (assessing alternative grou nds 
for limiting alienability and rejecting paternalist grounds in favor of grounds relating to values of 
personhood). But see Brock, supra note 1 1 , at 5 6 1 -62 (plausible personhood theories do not reject 
paternalism but rather balance paternalism against autonomy). 
14. Must opponents of surrogacy "reconcile their arguments with the growing body of law recog­
nizing a broad right to privacy and reproductive freedom"? Note, Developing a Concept, supra note 
8, at 1 295 .  Perhaps so. But reconciliation requires recognizing that couples may have privacy 
rights protecting surrogacy. It does not require concluding that they do have them. 
1 5 . See Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1 849, 1 928- 1936  ( 1 987) (discussing 
implications of commodification and market-inalienability and choosing market-inalienability as 
"better non-ideal solution"); O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 
65 N.C.L. REv. 1 27,  142 ( 1 986) (surrogate parenting raises commodification and inalienable rights 
issues). 
1 988] PR IVACY, SU RROGACY, AND BAB Y  M 1763 
parental rights in exchange for money, in the end a child has been commer­
cially disposed and acquired. 
Thus, the medical technology that brought commercial surrogacy into 
vogue is a step backward from what could be seen as post-Civil War 
America's progress toward the decommercialization of human worth. Surro­
gacy has other symbolically and materially retrogressive consequences. The 
pouring of private resources into surrogacy so that couples may adopt 
healthy white babies sends a message of rejection and despair to non-whites 
and the handicapped. Moreover, children bred of surrogacy arrangements, 
though glad to be alive, may be burdened with extraordinary feelings of in­
debtedness to their biological fathers and resentment toward their unknown 
natural mothers. All children may be burdened by special fears and insecuri­
ties in a society where their parents may obtain money for family necessaries 
by giving away newborn siblings. 
These concerns provide a basis for opposing surrogacy that is at least as 
compelling as the privacy rights thought to support the practice. 1 6  Indeed, 
opponents of surrogacy who contend that it is degradation, exploitation, 
slavery, baby selling, or racism believe that they have met the challenges 
posed by high regard for privacy rights and by liberal intolerance of mere 
moralism and paternalism. 1 7 
16. A number of surrogacy's troubling consequences are underemphasized because they resist 
characterization in the traditional language of negative libertarian rights. Consider, for example, the 
consequences enumerated in the last paragraph, some of which Judge Posner dismisses as merely 
"symbolic" objections. See Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B .U.L. REV. 59, 
70 ( 1 987) (proposing commercial market in white babies). 
1 7 .  Surrogacy has implications deeply relevant to womens' lives and economic opportunties. To 
start, permissive commercial surrogacy laws conjoined with public support for the practice could be  
expected to  encourage women who need money to  undertake the health and mortality risks of 
pregnancy and childbirth. 
Judge Sorkow's now moot Baby M opinion stood for empowering women to use their reproduc­
tive capacities. But we should be reluctant to create new categories of dead-end employment for 
women. Millions of working women have already been shunted off into low paying, low esteem 
"female" jobs. Qualitatively better uses can be found for women's considerable resources. 
Admittedly, surrogacy is temporary employment which could well serve the short-term needs of 
particular women. Surrogacy could allow a young woman to finance a year of college, graduate 
school, or travel. (Imagine, the au pair of the 1 990s may be a surrogate mother, rather than a mere 
babysitter.) It could allow an office worker to finance a sabbatical. It  could enable a single mother 
to start a nest egg or to cope with the economic consequences of spousal abandonment. It could 
enable a housewife to earn the down payment on a family home or to help stave off bankruptcy. It 
could provide a woman who did not want to rear a child an opportunity to experience pregnancy 
and childbirth. 
But opportunities become imperatives in the lives of poor women. If surrogacy is a job, women in 
need will take it. Husbands, boyfriends, and their own sense of responsibility will inevitably pres­
sure poor women into surrogacy. This problem becomes more acute as new forms of surrogacy 
become widely practiced. I have in mind the modes of surrogacy that will enable non-white women 
to serve as the gestators of white children on behalf of infertile whites. In the face of this prospect, 
it could be argued that it is no worse for the upper-middle class to hire poor, minority, and third-
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This essay argues that constitutional privacy prohibits the validation and 
enforcement of irrevocable surrogacy agreements. My conviction is two-fold :  
1 )  childless men and couples do not have privacy rights that entitle them to  
state enforcement of  surrogacy agreements; and 2)  by contrast, would-be sur­
rogate mothers have constitutional privacy rights so strong as to limit their 
own capacities for alienating their procreative and traditional parental pre­
rogatives. My purpose is to expose the broad parameters of defenses and the 
denials of this conviction. 
In Part I, I explicate the dueling privacy arguments advanced in the two 
New Jersey Baby M opinions. These modest state court opinions point to­
ward large questions about the nature and implications of individual privacy 
rights under the Constitution. I maintain that Chief Justice Wilentz misdiag­
nosed Judge Sorkow's fractured logic, but achieved a practical cure by order­
ing remand and partial reversal. Heavily relying on state law, the Chief 
Justice avoided direct confrontation with daunting (though basic) jurispru­
dential questions about the scope of constitutional privacy and the power of 
the individual to exercise and alienate her privacy rights. 
In Part II, I consider the implausibility and implications of arguments for 
enforcing surrogacy agreements based solely on the constitutional privacy 
rights of the childless man or couple. I conclude that the arbitrary and am­
biguous attributions of privacy rights that typify recent cases increase the 
risk of inadequate, unjust adjudication of surrogacy disputes. In Part III ,  I 
briefly consider the reasons for protecting fundamental privacy rights by im­
posing conditions of inalienability. 
I. Two COU RTS, Two ANALYSES 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROU N D  
In the sense intended here, the expression "privacy" denotes an aspect of 
liberty. It refers to freedom from public-that is, governmental-interfer­
ence with decisionmaking respecting procreation, families, and other appro­
priately private matters. 1 8  The Supreme Court has held that individuals have 
a fundamental, constitutional right to this kind of privacy and has relied 
upon this right to invalidate a range of state laws deemed to obstruct autono-
world women as highly paid surrogates, than to regularly employ those same women at minimum 
wage for childcare and housework that take them away from their own families. There is some­
thing to this maddening point, yet it falls short of justifying the more risky and personally momen­
tous practice that carries significant emotional and material implications for others. 
1 8 . See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (Constitu­
tion embodies promise that certain private spheres of individual liberty will be kept beyond reach of 
government); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.  589, 599-600 ( 1 977) (one meaning of constitutional privacy 
is freedom from government interference). 
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mous decisions relating to marriage, 1 9 procreation,20 child rearing,2 1 and ed­
ucation.22 The Court has specifically held, however, that fundamental 
constitutional privacy rights may yield to compelling state interests.23 More­
over, it has occasionally denied constitutional protection to what particular 
petitioners have contended also should be unregulated private conduct.24 
The Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of surrogate-parenting 
agreements. Although many join me in speculating about what the Court 
would or should do, precedent does not press inexorably in any specific direc­
tion.25 Neither, of course, does the bare text of the constitution provide any 
explicit guidance. These are important points. Without guidance from pre­
cedent or text, we are faced with the policy question of what human transac­
tions a liberal democracy ought to tolerate and forbid in the name of privacy 
rights. 
B. SOME STATE COURT PRECEDENTS 
Before Baby M, a few other state courts had implied or asserted that con-
1 9 .  See Loving v. Virginia, 388  U.S . I, 12 ( 1 966) (state statutory scheme forbidding interracial 
marriages violates due process because freedom to marry is fundamental). 
20. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 43 1 U.S. 678 (1977) (because right to privacy in 
procreational decisions extends to minors, statute prohibiting sale of contraceptives to minors is 
unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 4 1 0  U.S. 1 1 3 ,  ! 54 ( 1 973) (absolute prohibition of abortion violates 
right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 3 8 1  U.S. 4 79, 485 (1 965) (state statute forbidding use of 
contraceptives violates constitutional right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 3 1 6  U .S .  5 35 ,  541  
(1942) (forced sterilization of  recidivist criminal violates fourteenth amendment). Skinner was de­
scribed in Baby M as the most pertinent Supreme Court procreative rights case. See Baby M, II. 
109 N.J. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1 254. 
2 1 .  See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 ,  658 ( 1 972) (state statute presuming unmarried fathers 
are unsuitable and neglectful parents held unconstitutional). 
22. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 5 10, 535  ( 1 925) (statute requiring education in 
public schools violates liberty to choose private education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U .S .  390, 399 
( 1 923)  (statute forbidding teaching of any foreign language interferes with right of parents and 
teacher to choose how to educate children). 
23. See Roe v. Wade, 4 1 0  U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1 973) (abortion privacy not absolute because state has legiti­
mate, compelling interest in maternal health and unborn life). 
24. A recent example of this denial of constitutional protection was Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 1 86 (1 986),  in which the Court held that states abridge no constitutional privacy rights by 
criminalizing the consensual sex acts that take place in the bedrooms of adult homosexuals. !d. at 
1 92. However, the Court did not reach the issue of whether such c riminalization violates the eighth 
amendment. !d. at 1 9 6  n .8 .  
25 .  See Robertson, supra note I ,  at  420 (defining and articulating scope of right to procreative 
privacy will set Court adrift in largely uncharted waters). Neither predicting what the Court would 
do nor prescribing what it ought to do is an easy task in view of the controversies that surround the 
derivation of the general privacy right and its application to particular cases. See generally Allen, 
Privacy, Private Choice and Social Contract Theory, 56  CINCINNATI L. REV. 461 , 46 1 -68 ( 1 987). 
The problem of predicting what the Court will do is even worse if Martha Minow is correct that the 
Court has simply invented "a tradition of constitutional protection for the families" out of cases in 
which conflicts distinct from the family versus the state were centrally at issue. Minow, We, the 
Family: Constitutional R ights and American Families, 74 J. AM.  HIST. 959, 982 ( 1 987). 
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stitutional privacy rights compel states to enforce the payment and parental 
rights termination provisions of surrogate-parenting agreements. A Michi­
gan appeals court has emphasized that its state law leaves individuals free to 
enter into noncommercial surrogacy pacts .26 The court hinted that this free­
dom might be required by constitutional privacy rights.27 The Kentucky 
Supreme Court gave legal effect to commercial surrogacy contracts, sug­
gesting in dicta that laws that prohibit paid surrogate mothering are uncon­
stitutional violations of the procreative privacy rights of men who could not 
otherwise beget biologically-related children.28 An ambivalent New York 
surrogate's court cited Kentucky's constitutional privacy argument and held 
that surrogate-parenting contracts are not void, but voidable "because the 
individual state's adoption statutes, which are designed to protect the best 
interest of the child, take precedence over any agreement between the 
parties. "29 
Similarly, in Baby M, Judge Sorkow concluded that, subject only to the 
court's determination of the best interests of the child, commercial surrogacy 
agreements must be enforced pursuant to the constitutional privacy interest 
of married couples who are medically unable to have children of their own. 30 
Sorkow's analysis was unanimously rejected by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, which held that commercial surrogacy agreements are contrary to 
public policy and unlawful under state adoption statutes. 3 1 Surrogacy con­
tracts cannot eliminate the right a mnther has under New Jersey law to 
change her mind about terminating her parental rights. 
C. THE S UPERIOR COURT'S OPINION 
1 .  Sorkow's Privacy Analysis 
Judge Sorkow's opinion gave rise to many more uncertainties about the 
scope and requirements of constitutional privacy than it answered. The pri­
vacy analysis was described as mere "commentary."32 Accordingly, the 
26. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 173, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (1981), cert denied, 459 U.S .  
1183 (1983) .  But see Yates v. Keane, Nos. 9758,  5772, slip op.  (Mich. Cir. Ct .  Jan.  21, 1988)  
(surrogacy agreements void as  contrary to public policy). 
27. 106 Mich. App. at 441, 307 N.W.2d at 173. Plaintiffs' attorneys in  the case included Noel 
Keane who argued that constitutional privacy rights protect decisions to participate in surrogacy 
arrangements. See generally N. KEANE, THE SURROGATE MoTHER (1981) . 
28. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. Inc.  v. Kentucky ex rei. Armstrong, 704 S .W.2d 209, 212 (Ky.  
1986).  
29.  In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J. ,  132  Misc. 2d 972, 976-78, 505 N.Y.S .2d 813 ,  816 (Sur. 
1986). 
30. Baby M, I, N.J. Super. at 338 ,  525 A.2d at 1166. 
31. Baby M, II, 109 N.J. at 434-36, 537 A.2d at 1246-47. 
32. The primary issue to be determined by  this litigation is what are the best interests of a 
child until now called "Baby M". All other concerns raised by counsel constitute com­
mentary. That commentary includes the need to determine if a unique arrangement "e-
I 
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principal question before the court was not the privacy rights of the parties 
nor the legal status of the surrogacy agreement. Rather, the "primary issue" 
was the best interests of the child, Baby M. 33 
Judge Sorkow's loose and purportedly superfluous privacy analysis was an 
ambitious outline for legitimating commercial surrogacy by analogy to tradi­
tional modes of marital procreation. The fragmented analysis was served up 
as the central ratio decidendi for his opinion that the surrogate-parenting 
agreement between Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern was "a valid 
and enforceable contract pursuant to the laws of New Jersey."34 
The judge reasoned from two strands of case precedent-"fundamental 
family rights" developed since Meyer v. Nebraska, 35 along with a general 
"right of privacy" first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut 36 and again in 
R oe v. Wade. 37 He argued that these two closely related lines of authority 
jointly prohibit states from invading the private sphere of procreative and 
family decisionmaking by enacting laws that invalidate commercial surro­
gacy contracts. 38 Judge Sorkow thus held that family and procreative pri­
vacy rights legitimate both private use of commercial surrogates and public 
validation and enforcement of surrogacy agreements. 
Sorkow's opinion is confused by references to constitutional prerogatives 
tween a man and a woman, unmarried to each other, creates a contract. If so, is the 
contract enforceable; and if so, by what criteria, means and manner. 
Baby M, I, 2 1 7  N.J. Super. at 3 1 3 ,  525 A.2d at 1 1 32.  
33 .  Jd. 
34. Jd. at 338 ,  525 A .2d at 1 1 66. Consistent with the two New Jersey court opinions, Mary Beth 
Whitehead-Gould, now divorced and remarried, will be  referred to as "Mary Beth Whitehead" or 
"Whitehead." 
35 .  262 U.S.  390, 399 ( 1923). 
36.  38 1 u.s. 479, 485-86 ( 1 965). 
37. 4 1 0  U.S. 1 1 3 ,  1 52-53 ( 1 973). 
3 8. Baby M, I. 217 N.J. Super. at 385-87, 525 A.2d at 1 1 64.  States may interfere with fundamen-
tal privacy only "upon showing of a compelling interest." !d. at 3 87, 525 A.2d at 1 1 65.  Moreover: 
[I]f one has a right to procreate coitally, then one has the right to reproduce non-coitally. 
I f  it  is reproduction that is protected, then the means of reproduction are also to be  pro­
tected. The values and interests underlying the creation of a family are the same by  
whatever means obtained. This court holds that the protected means extends to  the use of 
surrogates. The contract cannot fail because of the use of a third party . . . .  While a state 
could . . .  and must regulate . . .  reproductive contracts, it could not ban or refuse to 
enforce such transactions . . .  without compelling reason. It might even be argued that 
refusal to enforce these contracts and prohibition of money payments would constitute an 
unconstitutional interference with procreative liberty since it would prevent childless 
couples from obtaining the means by which to have families . . . .  
Legislation or court action that denies the surrogate contract impedes a couple's [four­
teenth amendment] liberty that is otherwise protected. The surrogate who voluntarily 
chooses to enter such a contract is deprived of a constitutionally protected right to per­
form services. 
Jd. at 386-87,  525 A.2d at 1 1 64-65 .  
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that either are related to or synonymous with privacy. (He does not tell us 
which.) He referred to "a couple's liberty," by which he appears to have 
meant their privacy, as an aspect of fourteenth amendment liberty. 39 He also 
briefly referred to the surrogate's "right to perform services," which he also 
seems to have suggested has its basis in the fourteenth amendment.40 He 
appears to have assumed that this right to perform noncoital procreative 
services is part of the fourteenth amendment liberty we call "freedom of con­
tract" rather than the liberty we call "privacy. "41 
Judge Sorkow also sketched an equal protection analysis that introduced 
constitutional values around which his ancillary privacy argument was 
shaped. 42 This equal protection of privacy argument was launched from the 
observation that sperm donation, a kind of "surrogate fatherhood," is al­
ready universally permitted in the United States. He gave no explanation for 
his opaque assertion that a ban on female surrogacy denies equal protection 
to "the surrogate, whether male or female, and the unborn child."43 
Topping off his privacy and equal protection arguments, Judge Sorkow 
concluded that a surrogacy contract that is not contrary to a state's public 
policy and that is entered into with "understanding and free will" may be 
enforced. 44 He added that specific performance is an appropriate remedy 
when a breaching surrogate mother refuses to surrender parental rights as 
agreed.45 This latter conclusion is strikingly out of line with the common 
law doctrine that personal service contracts are not specifically enforceable­
an indication of just how weighty the judge believed procreative privacy 
rights to be. In deciding to exercise his equitable discretion to specifically 
enforce the Whitehead-Stern contract on behalf of Mr. Stern, Judge Sorkow 
opined that Mrs. Whitehead "received her fulfillment" but "Mr. Stern did 
not," and that " (m]onetary damages cannot possibly compensate the plaintiff 
39. !d. at 387, 525 A.2d at 1165.  Perhaps he intended to say that the fourteenth amendment 
protects freedom of contract in general and the right to privacy (whatever its textual basis) protects 
privacy-related contracts in particular .  
40. !d. 
41. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (fourteenth amendment limits ability of state 
to interfere with employment contracts). 
42. A similar equal protection of privacy argument appeared in Surrogate Parenting Assocs. , 704 
S.W.2d at 212. 
43. Baby M, I, 217 N.J. Super. at 388,  525 A.2d at 1165. 
The "surrogate fa ther" sperm donor is legally recognized in all states. The surrogate 
mother is not. If a man may offer the means for procreation then a woman must equa lly 
be allowed to do so. To rule otherwise denies equal protection of law to the childless 
couple, the surrogate, whether male or female, and the unborn child. 
!d. The reference to the unborn child here is mysterious. Sorkow may have viewed unborn children 
as third-party beneficiaries. See id. at 400, 525 A.2d at 117 1 ( "a third-party beneficiary need not be 
in existence . . .  at the time of the contracting"). 
44. !d. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1166. 
45. !d. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1165 .  
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for the loss of his bargain. "46 
2. The Child's Best Interests 
Sorkow's conclusion that the Whitehead-Stern surrogacy agreement was a 
legally valid, specifically enforceable contract was grounded in constitutional 
privacy. However, Baby M's fate was determined by the best interests of the 
child, rather than by the logical entailments of constitutional privacy. Judge 
Sorkow superimposed this best interests analysis over his privacy analysis to 
decide which biological parent should be awarded custody. The judge deter­
mined that specific enforcement of the surrogacy contract, otherwise called 
for by law and equity, was also in the best interests of Baby M.47 
Never was there a real contest between Mrs. Whitehead and Mr. Stern. 
Mary Beth Whitehead was severely criticized by the court as "unreliable, . . .  
manipulative, impulsive . . .  exploitative, . . .  [and] untruthful."48 By con­
trast, the Sterns were lauded as cooperative, stable, and rational in the face of 
crisis. They were praised as "credible, sincere and truthful people."49 Afflu­
ent, well-educated, competent, and warm, the Sterns presented the promise 
of an ideal nuclear family life in which Baby M would have every 
advantage. 50 
The trial court therefore terminated "all parental rights that Mary Beth 
Whitehead has or had in the child to be known as Melissa Stern," curiously 
pointing back to the supplanted surrogacy agreement as an additional source 
of equity for the decision. 5 1 Mr. Stern was awarded sole custody, and the 
court's termination of Whitehead's maternal rights meant that, through legal 
adoption, Mrs. Stern could expect to replace Whitehead as Melissa's legal 
mother. 52 
Judge Sorkow viewed his determination of the child's best interests as nec­
essary and overriding since any "agreement between parents is inevitably 
subservient to the considerations of the best interests of the child."53  One is 
thus led to conclude that, in theory, the Whiteheads would have been 
awarded custody of Baby M had the facts indicated they would have been 
better parents than the Sterns. One is also led to conclude that Mary Beth 
46. Jd. 
47. !d. a t  394-400, 525 A.2d 1 1 67-72. 
48. !d. at  396-97, 525 A.2J at 1 1 69-70. 
49 . Jd. at 398, 525 A.2d at 1 170; see also id. at 394-98, 525 A.2d at 1 1 67-70 (describing the 
Sterns;. 
50. Chief Justice Wilentz chastised the trial court for its harsh characterization of Whitehead 
and its overemphasis of the Sterns' interest in educating the child. Baby M, lJ, 1 09 N.J. at 459, 537 
A.2d at 1 259. 
51. Baby M, I, 2 17 N.J. Super . at  400, 525 A.2d at  1 172.  
52. !d. at  398-400, 525 A.2d at  1 1 67-70. 
53 .  !d. at 398, 525 A.2d at 1 17 1 .  
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Whitehead would have been awarded joint custody or visitation rights if the 
court had determined that the best interests of Baby M would have been 
served by access to both of her biological parents. 
The overarching logic of his opinion renders Sorkow's privacy analysis and 
holdings supererogatory on the facts of Baby M But Sorkow's logic did not 
rule out duties for a privacy analysis in principle. His privacy analysis sup­
plied a rule, albeit short-lived, that surrogacy agreements are valid in New 
Jersey. Thus, under the precedent set by Sorkow's Baby M, a valid surrogacy 
contract should provide grounds in law and equity to resolve custody dis­
putes in favor of the nonbreaching parent unless the child's best interests 
dictate otherwise. 54 
In the surrogacy context, however, it is difficult to imagine when a court 
following Sorkow's precedent would conclude that both biological parents 
are equally fit. Women who become paid surrogates are likely to have con­
siderably less in the way of personal and economic resources than the affluent 
purchasers of their services. In addition, when a court turns to questions of 
character, the biological father, in search of a nuclear family, has a built-in 
cultural advantage. Regrettably, under traditional standards of female moral 
character, 55 the virtue of the surrogate is automatically thrown into question 
when she agrees to bear a child and give it up for cash. Furthermore, a 
surrogate's rationality is automatically questioned when she changes her 
mind about so momentous a matter as giving birth to a stranger's child and 
giving up her parental rights. 
D. REEXAMINATION IN THE STATE SUPREME COU RT 
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with Judge Sorkow that awarding 
custody of Melissa to the Sterns was in the child's best interests. 56 Agree­
ment ended there. The court went on to invalidate the previously validated 
Whitehead-Stern surrogacy agreement, 57 restore Mary Beth Whitehead's pa­
rental rights, 58 and remand for the purpose of determining the precise extent 
of Whitehead's newly established visitation rights. 59 The opinion was strik­
ing for its sweeping rejection of commercial surrogacy on a panoply of statu-
54. Id. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1 1 67.  
55 .  Bearing a child is not what subjects the surrogate's character to attack. I t  is that she would 
do so outside of a traditional marriage and would command payment. See generally L. BANNER, 
WOMEN IN MODERN AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY 43, 51-91 (1984) (exploring traditional view 
that women are morally superior and ideally suited to life of self-sacrificial marriage and mother­
hood); C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFERRENT VoiCE (1982) (suggesting that moral expectations of and for 
women differ from those of and for men). 
56. Baby M, II. 109 N.J. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259.  
57. Id. at 421-22, 537 A.2d at 1240. 
58. Id. at 447, 537 A.2d at 1 253 .  
59. Id. at  466-67, 537 A.2d at  1263. 
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tory and policy grounds;60 for its efforts to rehabilitate Whitehead's 
character;61 and for its strident normative defense of the prerogatives of nat­
ural parents and birth mothers .62 
1 .  State Law and Polley 
The basic argument of the supreme court was that private parties cannot 
lawfully utilize commercial service contracts to circumvent the requirements 
of state law and policy designed to protect the interests of natural parents 
and the best interests of children. The court found that the Whitehead-Stem 
surrogacy contract conflicted with: "( 1 )  laws prohibiting the use of money in 
connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or 
abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption 
is granted; and (3) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to adop­
tion revocable in private placement adoptions. "63 The court further found 
the surrogacy contract in conflict with state policies that custody should be 
based on the best interests of the child rather than on private agreements, 64 
and that neither natural parent has parental rights superior to the other.65 
The court concluded that, in view of these state statutes and policies, and 
because the trial court did not establish that Whitehead was an unfit parent, 
appeal to the surrogacy agreement and the child's best interests provided 
legaliy insufficient grounds for terminating Whitehead's parental rights.66 
The court's decision was at least a partial victory for Whitehead. She did 
not get primary custody of her child, but she won visitation rights, much like 
the rights of a noncustodial divorced parent. The decision also was a partial 
victory for Mr. Stern. He was awarded the privilege of rearing his natural 
daughter in his own home. However, Whitehead's reinstatement made Mrs. 
Stern a significant loser. Unable to adopt Baby M, she was transformed into 
the true "surrogate" mother of a stepdaughter. 
2. Constitutional Privacy 
The state supreme court rejected both the constitutional privacy and equal 
protection of privacy arguments advanced by the lower court to validate sur­
rogacy agreements. Unfortunately, however, the court scarcely treated the 
60. !d. at 421-22, 423, 425, 429, 434, 435-36, 437, 443-44, 537 A.2d at 1240, 1240-41,  1242, 1 244, 
1 246, 1247, 1248, 1250. 
61 . Regrettably, the court sought to rehabilitate Whitehead at the expense of Mrs. Stern, whose 
motives for deciding against pregnancy were thrown unfairly, and needlessly, into question. See id. 
at 456, 537 A.2d at 1 257-58.  
62. !d. at 437, 537 A.2d. at 1248. 
63.  !d. at 423, 537 A.2d 1240-4 1 .  
64. !d. at  437, 537 A.2d a t  1248. 
65. !d. at 435-36, 5 37 A.2d at 1 247. 
66. !d. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252. 
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constitutional issues; i t  did little more than acknowledge that the parties had 
asserted constitutional privacy and equal protection claims. The court was 
apparently confident that New Jersey's limitation on commercial surrogacy 
was justified by strong state interests in child welfare and parental liberty. It 
seemed not to take seriously the possibility that fundamental constitutional 
rights require permissive commercial surrogacy laws and enforcement of ir­
revocable surrogacy agreements. 
The right to procreate-"the right to have natural children, whether 
through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination"67-was identified by 
the court as the privacy right that Stern claimed for himself. The court nar­
rowly construed this right as the right to be a biological parent, asserting that 
"the right of procreation does not extend as far as claimed by the Sterns. "68 
The paternal right of procreation did not give rise to a contractually-based 
custody award because, the court reasoned, Whitehead could claim procrea­
tive rights also: 
To assert that Mr. Stern's right of procreation gives him the right to the 
custody of Baby M would be to assert that Mrs. Whitehead's right of pro­
creation does not give her the right to the custody of Baby M; it would be 
to assert that the constitutional right of procreation includes within it  a 
constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy someone else's right 
of procreation . . . .  
There is nothing in our culture . . .  or society that even begins to suggest 
a fundamental right on the part of a father to the custody of the child as 
part of his right to procreate when opposed by the claim of the mother to 
the same child.69 
Thus, the court portrayed Stern's claim as contradictory. The court was 
wrong, however, in suggesting that Stern argued that his right to procreate 
gave him a right to custody solely because he was his child's father. Rather, 
Stern's argument was that he ought to be awarded custody because his 
child's natural mother had freely, knowingly, and irrevocably exchanged her 
parental rights for compensation. 
Stern can be understood as having claimed that our culture, and its laws, 
ought to recognize a particularly broad right to procreation. This right in­
cludes the use of the services of a woman willing freely to bind herself by 
irrevocable contract to conceive through artificial insemination in the exer­
cise of her procreative rights, and to give up her parental rights to the child 
67. !d. at 448, 537 A .2d at 1 253 .  
68 .  !d. at  44 7,  537 A.2d at  1 253 .  The court's remark leaves a great deal unclear. I t  could have 
been intended either: ( I) as a rejection of a privacy right that would protect the use of a surrogate 
as well as the exclusive parental and child custody provisions of the surrogacy agreement; or 
(2) only as a rejection of the privacy right that would protect the exclusive parental and child 
custody provisions of the agreement. 
69. !d. at 448-49, 537 A.2d at 1 254. 
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so conceived. Essentially, Stern claimed that-insofar as they oppose state­
enforced surrogacy-New Jersey state law and policy unconstitutionally re­
strained his procreative freedom. 
The supreme court's state law emphasis, combined with its misinterpreta­
tion of Stem's argument as a contradiction, enabled it to avoid directly con­
fronting several important implications of the exercise and alienation of 
constitutional privacy rights. These ideas, which I will pursue below in Parts 
II and III, are, first, that the Whitehead-Stem contract was the free exercise 
of constitutionally protected, procreative privacy rights by a childless man or 
couple; second, that the contract purporting to alienate Whitehead's parental 
rights was a free exercise of her procreative privacy rights; and finally, that 
the Whitehead-Stern contract was a mutual exercise of Mr. Stem's and Mrs. 
Whitehead's procreative and parental privacy rights. The state supreme 
court impliedly rejected these ideas, without explanation. 
Holding that commercial and irrevocable surrogacy agreements are 
invalid, the court established that current New Jersey policy and statutes 
limit the alienability of procreative and parental rights. But Baby M did not 
carefully reconcile existing New Jersey limitations on alienability with the 
constitutional claims of men and women who want to participate in surro­
gacy arrangements. Nor did it foretell the extent to which future surrogacy 
legislation, liberalizing revocability and commercialization restrictions in 
New Jersey, would be subject to constitutional challenge by parties claiming 
relief from contract enforcement. 
Taking its opinion as a whole, it is easy to account for the court's choice to 
avoid unnecessary, deep confrontation with the jurisprudence of constitu­
tional privacy rights. In the first place, the court doubted that Whitehead 
entered the contract freely and with full information. Economic pressure 
may have made her agreement less than free.70 Lack of knowledge about her 
eventual attachment to the child made her choice inadequately informed.7 1 
In addition, the court clearly viewed itself as reasserting its traditional inter­
est in promoting child welfare and the family. 72 Finally, the court suggested 
that a specific performance remedy for breach of a surrogacy contract could 
excessively restrain liberty and violate the thirteenth amendment. 73 
The court noted briefly that Mary Beth Whitehead's constitutional privacy 
rights may have included maternal rights of companionship in addition to 
her basic procreative privacy rights. 74 The court seemed to imply that these 
rights, like her procreative rights, gave her valid custody claims necessarily 
70. !d. at 440, 537 A.2d at 1 249. 
7 1 .  !d. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1 248. 
72. !d. 
73 .  !d. at 450-5 1 ,  537 A.2d at 1 255 .  
74 .  !d. Is this a facile multiplication of privacy rights? I think not. See Stanley v. I l l inois, 405 
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in  competition with those of  Stern. The court declined to  explore White­
head's companionship rights on the grounds that state law and policy, ad­
vancing compelling state interests, independently established them. 
3. Equal Protection 
In two short paragraphs, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Judge 
Sorkow's equal protection argument which had maintained that New Jersey 
must permit access to surrogacy services because state law already permits 
access to sperm donation.75 To do otherwise, the trial court had argued, 
wrongfully discriminates against infertile females or female-infertile couples 
who wish to have children.76 Recognizing that the equal protection clause 
imposes upon the states an obligation to treat like cases alike, the supreme 
court simply denied that utilization of a sperm bank by a male-infertile 
couple is relevantly similar to utilization of a surrogate by a female-infertile 
couple: 
It  is quite obvious that the situations are not parallel. A sperm donor sim­
ply cannot be equated with a surrogate mother. The State has more than a 
sufficient basis to distinguish the two situations . . .  so as to justify automat­
ically divesting the sperm donor of his parental rights without automati­
cally divesting a surrogate mother. 77 
The court went on to suggest that such an equal protection analogy would be 
more appropriate in another situation made possible by new reproductive 
technologies: the contribution of a fertilized or unfertilized egg for implanta­
tion in another's uterus, which entails no long-term gestational services. 7 8  
II .  WHOSE PRIVACY? 
Stepping back from the Baby M case, I would like to assess the doubtful 
proposition that the constitutional privacy rights of childless men or couples 
require state validation and enforcement of surrogacy agreements. My aims 
are to expose why this proposition is unpersuasive and to trace the implica­
tions of some alternative attributions of privacy rights. 
A. FOUR MODELS FOR PRIVACY-RIGHT ATTRIBUTION 
An adequate general jurisprudence of surrogacy ideally would require that 
any judicial attribution of privacy rights in connection with surrogatP. parent-
U.S.  645, 65 1 (referring to parental interest in the ·•companionship, care, custody, and management 
of his or her children"). 
75. Baby M. 11, 1 09 N .J .  at 449-50, 537  A.2d at 1 254-55. 
76. Baby M, I. 2 1 7  N .J. Super at 387-88, 525 A.2d at 1 1 65.  
77 .  Baby M. II. 1 09 N . J. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1 254. 
78. !d. 
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ing be  nonarbitrary and unambiguous. At  least four models of  privacy-right 
attribution present themselves.79 The procreative or family privacy at issue 
in a surrogacy case can be viewed as belonging to either: ( 1 )  the childless 
couple; (2) the biological father; (3) the contractual couple consisting of the 
surrogate and biological father; or (4) the surrogate mother. 
Judge Sorkow acknowledged only one such model in the Baby M trial. 
Sorkow's constitutional privacy analysis attributed privacy protections only 
to the childless couple. Because he stated no reason for choosing to carry.out 
the privacy analysis from the point of view of ( 1 )  rather than (2), (3), or (4), 
Sorkow's focus on the privacy of the childless couple is unambiguous, but 
arbitrary. 
In another noted surrogacy case, Doe v. Kelley, 80 the core problem was 
ambiguity rather than arbitrariness. There, a married couple, a prospective 
surrogate mother, and other anonymous parties sought a declaratory judg­
ment against the state attorney general and local county prosecutor affirming 
their claim that Michigan statutes prohibiting "the exchange of money or 
other consideration in connection with adoption and related proceedings . . .  
impermissibly infringe upon their constitutional right to privacy."8 1 Plain­
tiffs John and Mary Doe planned to enter a commercial surrogate-parenting 
agreement with John Doe's secretary, Mary Roe. Under the terms of the 
contemplated agreement, the Does would have promised to pay Mary Roe 
$5,000, over and above medical and employment benefits, to terminate pa­
rental rights to a child born as a consequence of artificial insemination with 
the sperm of John Doe. The court denied the requested declaration. Instead, 
it held that "[w]hile the decision to bear or beget a child [is] a fundamental 
interest protected by the right of privacy, . . .  we do not view this right as a 
valid prohibition to state interference in the plaintiffs' contractual 
arrangement. "82 
The terse opinion in Doe v. Kelley was ambiguous inasmuch as it did not 
indicate whose privacy right to "bear or beget" it was referring to. The opin­
ion identified the plaintiffs-including both the Does and Mary Roe-as as-
79. I leave open the possibility that there are other models of attribution. 
80. 106 M ich. App. 1 69, 1 7 3-74, 307 N.W.2d 438, 44 1 ( 1 98 1 ). 
8 1 .  !d. at 1 70, 1 72, 307 N. W.2d at 439-40. 
82. !d. at 1 73 ,  307 N.W. 2d at 44 1 .  The Michigan appeals court declined to uphold commercial 
surrogacy, but sanctioned good samaritan surrogacy, when it  concluded that, although the adoption 
statute made it impossible to alter the legal status of the child, the statute did "not directly prohibit 
John Doe and Mary Roe from having the child as planned." !d. However, as observed by com­
mentators and, five years later, by a New York court: "The net effect of the decision prohibits the 
use of surrogate mothers in the State of Michigan since few women other than perhaps a close 
family member would bear someone else's child without compensation." In re Baby Girl L.J . ,  132 
Misc.2d 972,  976, 505 N.Y.S.2d 8 1 3, 816 (Sur. 1986). 
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serting a constitutional right of  procreative privacy, and acknowledged their 
fundamental right to "bear or beget. "  
Adding to  the ambiguity, the court further stated that John Doe and Mary 
Roe were not directly precluded by the payment prohibition from having the 
child as planned. 83 This remark could mean that the constitutional procrea­
tive privacy of John Doe and Mary Roe, rather than that of the Doe couple 
(or the entire plaintiff group), was centrally at issue. Indeed, the United 
States Supreme Court has upheld procreative privacy rights for individuals, 
whatever their marital status, as well as for married couples. 84 If the prece­
dent supports any surrogacy claim at all, there is no reason to believe it sup­
ports only a claim brought by married persons. 
If the New Jersey experience is any indicator, courts are likely to view 
Solomonic decisions about child custody and the protection of the biological 
family as their special burden in surrogacy cases. Still, courts that deem pri­
vacy rights relevant must decide whether to assign such rights by reference 
to: 1 )  the motives for procreation, entailing recognition of the sperm donor 
and any mate as the bearers of relevant privacy rights; 2) the burdens and 
rights of pregnancy, entailing recognition of the surrogate as the bearer of 
relevant privacy rights; 3) the fact of procreation, entailing that the contrac­
tual couple is the bearer of relevant privacy rights. 
1 .  The Childless Couple 
Sorkow's one-sided privacy commentary was doubtlessly prompted by 
constitutional privacy arguments the Sterns raised on their own behalf. 85  
Accordingly, the trial court appears to have set out with the narrow objective 
of tracing the implications of the constitutional privacy rights of married 
persons such as the Sterns. The court gave no consideration to the possibility 
that privacy rights might be attributed to the surrogate or shared between the 
surrogate and the biological father. 
Sorkow's married couple oriented privacy argument was weakly defended 
by appeal to factually inapposite United States Supreme Court family and 
procreative privacy cases. Most strained was his appeal to the abortion 
rights case, R oe v. Wade. 86 His argument proceeded as a long leap from the 
premise that pregnant women have a right to obtain a medical abortion to 
terminate fetal life to the conclusion that infertile or medically at-risk women 
83 .  106 Mich. App. at 1 73-74, 307 N.W.2d at 44 1 .  
84. Eisenstadt v .  Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 ( 1 972) (statute denying unmarried persons access 
to contraceptives violates equal protection and right to privacy). 
85. Judge Sorkow noted that " [t)he proponents of this surrogate-parenting agreement argue that 
their right to enter such a contract is protected by a fundamental right to procreate. This right of 
procreation is bottomed on an individual's constitutional right of privacy."  Baby M, I, 2 1 7  N.J.  
Super. at 384-85 ,  525 A.2d at 1 1 63-64. 
86. 4 1 0  U.S. 1 1 3  ( 1 973). 
1 98 8] PRIVACY, SU RROGACY, AND BAB Y  M 1 777 
and their spouses have a right to employ a third party to create a life. 87 This 
is far from straightforward analogical or deductive legal reasoning. Sorkow 
could have relied on R oe v. Wade more persuasively to argue that fertile 
women have a right of procreative privacy entitling them not only to abort, 
but also to create new life for reasons and purposes of their own, including 
surrogate motherhood. 
Several important Supreme Court reproductive rights cases have been 
brought by or against professionals and entities providing procreative serv­
ices. The Planned Parenthood cases88 and the recent Thornburgh v. A meri­
can College of Obstetricians 89 case make plain that the Court views personal 
procreative privacy rights as extending a mantle of immunity from state in­
terference around certain professionals and entities selected by married 
couples or individuals to provide services. In this vein, one might view the 
personal privacy right at stake in Baby M as having belonged to the Stern 
couple or to Mr. Stern, with only derivative privacy protection extending to 
Mary Beth Whitehead and others "used" to facilitate noncoital procreation. 
2. The Biological Father 
A derivative privacy rights theory in the surrogacy context can be seen in 
operation in a recent Kentucky case which stressed the primacy of the bio­
logical father's privacy. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Kentucky ex 
ref. A rmstrong, 90 an action commenced in 1 9 8 1 by the Kentucky Attorney 
General to revoke a corporate charter, alleged that Surrogate Parenting As­
sociates, Inc. (SPA) violated state adoption laws. 9 1  The trial court dismissed 
the complaint, holding that facilitation of surrogacy agreements between in­
fertile couples and fertile women was not an illegal breach of corporate pow­
ers. An appeals court reversed, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed 
87. The judge asserted: "If the law of our land sanctions a means to end life then that same law 
may be used to create and celebrate life . . . .  A woman and her husband have the right to procreate 
and rear a family." Baby M, I, 2 1 7  N.J. Super. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1664. The same argument has 
been made and criticized elsewhere. See Smith & Iraola, supra note 8, at 284 & n. 1 27 ("it has been 
suggested by some commentators that since a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy and to 
use contraceptives, a posteriori, the conduct required to bring about those procreative choices must 
also be protected"). 
88.  Planned Parenthood of Missouri v .  Danforth, 428 U.S. 52  ( 1 976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
3 8 1  U.S. 4 79 (I 965). 
89. 476 U.S 747 ( 1 986). 
90. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1 986). 
9 1 .  !d. at 2 1 0. According to the state attorney general, the firm violated two statutes prohibiting 
the "sale, purchase or procurement for sale or purchase of 'any child for the purpose of adoption'; 
. [the] filing for voluntary termination of parental rights 'prior to five (5) days after the birth of a 
child." In addition, SPA was accused of violating a third statute, which specified that '"consent for 
adoption' shall not 'be held valid if such consent for adoption is given prior to the fifth day after the 
birth of the child . ·  " ld. 
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the court of appeals' reversal .  92 
Citing Carey v. Population Services, 93 Judge Leibson, writing for the state 
supreme court, invoked the constitutional right of privacy to buttress his 
proposition that men, no less than women, should be permitted to rely on 
technology and the voluntary assistance of third-party surrogates for infertile 
or disabled spouses.94 The court stated that "we recognize ' [t]he decision 
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart . . .  of constitution­
ally protected choices. '  "95 This right to decisional privacy of men who desire 
biologically-related children, the court argued, prohibits barriers to the 
"tampering with nature" necessitated when a man is "unable to conceive [a 
child] in the customary manner. "96 
The court's argument plainly was structured to derive part of its force 
from the unfairness of a system that would leave women with infertile 
spouses free to obtain artificial insemination through sperm banks, but would 
not permit men with infertile spouses to obtain the assistance of artificially 
inseminated surrogates. Essentially this same point appeared in Baby M 
styled as a constitutional equal protection argument.97 The important point 
here is that the court's "men's privacy" analysis was the basis for its argu­
ment against termination of SPA's right to operate as a provider of surrogacy 
services. SPA impliedly was accorded constitutional privacy protection de­
rived from the primary constitutional privacy of married men. Presumably, 
here too, the surrogate's privacy rights would be only derivative. 
3. The Contractual Couple 
Judge Sorkow did not take seriously the possibility of ascribing rights of 
private procreative decisionmaking to the contractual couple rather than the 
92. The Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned that the state statute and policy against the "buying 
and selling of children" were not violated because "in the surrogate parenting procedure . . .  the 
agreement to bear the child is entered into before conception." !d. at 2 1 1 .  Furthermore, the court 
reasoned that the two statutes pertaining to voluntary termination of parental rights prior to five 
days after the birth were not violated because SPA "has freely acknowledged that the initial con­
tractual arrangements regarding the mother's surrender of custody and termination of parental 
rights are voidable." !d. at 2 12 .  That is, the state statutes are overriding. Consequently, irrespec­
tive of the terms of the contract between the surrogate mother and the biological father, the mother 
is acknowledged to have a statutory right, which she may not contractually waive, to change her 
mind at any time within five days of the birth of her child. As explained by the court, "(t]he 
surrogate mother's consent given before five days following the birth of the baby is no more legally 
binding than the decision of an unwed mother during her pregnancy that she will put her baby up 
for adoption." !d. at 2 1 2- 1 3 .  
93. 43 1 U.S.  678 ( 1 977). 
94. 704 S.W.2d at 2 1 2. 
95 .  !d. 
96. !d. 
97. Baby M, I, 2 1 7  N .J .  Super. 3 1 3, 3 87-88, 525 A.2d at 1 1 65 .  
i 
• 
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infertile married couple. 98 
Surrogacy agreements are joint ventures involving an extramarital decision 
to procreate. The cultural and individual meanings attached to biological 
parental ties, and the impetus to create them, contribute plausibility to the 
"right to procreative privacy" arguments. It is not self-evident that a con­
tractual couple, primarily bound by written agreement, should not be 
deemed to exercise the same procreative privacy rights that married couples 
exercise under the protective mantle of their wedding vows. Simply by virtue 
of the biological ties they seek to forge, both parties share cognizable privacy 
interests in the decision to have a child and in that child's fate. 99 
It may be appealing in the abstract to focus on the contractual couple as a 
distinct unit to which our political morality attributes privacy. Such attribu­
tion, however, could be expected to have limited appeal to participants in 
practice. The contractual couple model of ascribing privacy rights works less 
well than the others to shield all the spouses (or other intimate partners in­
volved) from feelings of guilt, envy, and betrayal that normally accompany 
extramarital pregnancies. These severe feelings, which might otherwise 
thwart persons from seriously considering providing or purchasing surrogacy 
services, can be lessened by premising the validity of surrogacy contracts on 
the marital couple's privacy or commercial rights. 
In contrast to Judge Sorkow, the New Jersey Supreme Court chose to fo­
cus on the contractual couple's procreative privacy rights. It therefore re­
jected Mr. Stern's argument that his procreative rights demanded victory for 
him, arguing that Mrs. Whitehead, as Melissa's mother, possessed identical 
procreative rights. 
98. The judge quickly dismissed this possibility during his rejection of visitation rights for the 
maternal grandparents. "Mrs. Whitehead and Mr. Stern," he stated simply, "were never a family 
unit." !d. at 404, 525 A.2d at 1 1 73 .  
99 .  I ronically, if surrogacy agreements are legal because they are considered marital procreative 
agreements instead of commercial deals, policy makers may be deprived of reasons to insist on the 
state's enforcement. Most of the agreements and undertakings of family life are not backed by the 
enforcement powers of the state. A wife owes her husband no contract damages if she makes a 
unilateral decision to abort. No injunction will issue against her to conceive, to abort, or not to 
abort. She will not be compelled to keep her word. Even the marriage commitment itself can be 
broken and a divorce obtained (nowadays, more or less unilaterally and on a no-fault basis). I t  is 
not plain why an agreement to provide a stranger the exclusive companionship of one's child should 
be specifically enforceable after a change of heart when an agreement to provide a person with the 
exclusive companionship of oneself as spouse is not. These facts of social life and family law may 
count against construing entry into surrogacy agreements as constitutionally protected private con­
duct giving rise to enforceable legal contracts. It may point toward viewing the promises that a 
woman makes to a man to carry and surrender a child as unenforceable personal plans or vows. See 
Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1 8 1 1 , 1 8 1 8  ( 1 988) (viewing such 
promises as statements of "prebirth intention to renounce parental interests"). 
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4 .  The Surrogate 
Assuming that the constitutional right of privacy has a justificatory role to 
play in the surrogacy context, is the best argument the "women' s privacy" 
argument? The "women's privacy" argument asserts that whether a wo­
man's motivation is to have her own child or to enter and fulfill the terms of 
a lucrative contract, she should be free from state interference with her 
choice to seek artificial insemination. 
To be sure, the "men's privacy" and "childless couple privacy" arguments, 
premised as they are on the desire to enjoy nuclear family life, pull at our 
heartstrings. The "women's privacy" argument is without comparable senti­
mental appeal. Moreover, the "women's privacy" argument ostensibly relies 
upon the principle that economically motivated choices respecting a wo­
man's body necessarily fall within the domain of constitutionally protected 
private choice. Widespread regulation and prohibition of commercial uses of 
the body, such as prostitution, render this principle doubtful. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that constitutional privacy does not include 
an absolute right to control one's own body. 100 
Yet, viewing the surrogate mother as having only derivative rights to enter 
surrogacy agreements seems curiously artificial. Indeed, it appears necessary 
to strain to view a woman who conceives, gestates, and gives birth to a child 
as having only derivative privacy interests in freedom from state interference. 
After all, she alone has the right to decide whether to become pregnant and, 
under R oe v. Wade, she alone has the right to decide whether to obtain a 
medical abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy. 10 1  
From this vantage point i t  seems that the surrogate's privacy right, far 
from being derivative in character, surely must be primary. The surrogate 
mother is more than an instrument of others' procreative liberty; indeed, she 
is more than a "surrogate." Surrogate motherhood is an exercise of procrea­
tive liberty. The entire surrogacy arrangement is possible only because of the 
surrogate's capacity, willingness, and liberty. 
In response, one could argue that the commercial character of the surro­
gate mother's aims and motives necessarily takes her outside the realm of 
constitutionally protected privacy. And, since the sperm donor and his mate 
desire to add a biologically related child to their family, the surrogacy trans­
action is very much in the realm of their constitutionally protected privacy. 
Initially, this perspective may appear to be supported by an analogy to 
female prostitution. The commercial nature of prostitution is often cited as 
the reason for its regulation and even criminalization. However, since a wo­
man who is artificially inseminated is not a vendor of sexual arousal, there is 
1 00. Roe v . Wade, 4 1 0  U.S. 1 1 3 ,  1 53 ( 1 973) (woman's right to abortion not absolute). 
1 0 1 .  !d. at 1 64. 
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no reason to view her as a prostitute. Still, some may be persuaded by the 
general argument that constitutional privacy protections cannot be applied, 
except derivatively, on behalf of a party whose principal motivation is mone­
tary gain, whether in relation to sex or procreation. This would mean that 
the sperm donor or couple, whose aim is to beget a biologically related child, 
can claim privacy rights against state interference, but the profit-seeking sur­
rogate mother cannot, except perhaps derivatively. 
It is orthodoxy, however, that neither the prostitute nor her plient can 
claim constitutional privacy rights to be free from state interference. Their 
sexual relationship is characterized as commercial rather than personal or 
familial, and thus as not warranting the special protection of fuhdamental 
rights. In the case of the prostitute-client relationship, her lack of constitu­
tionally protected privacy rights results in her clients' lack of such rights, 
even though a prostitute's clients subjectively may regard their encounters as 
personal, recreational sex. 
This analogy to prostitution forces us, willy-nilly, to conclude that the 
sperm donor equally lacks legitimate claims to constitutional privacy. Trac­
ing the analogy, one must conclude that because conception, gestation, and 
delivery are commercial services for the surrogate mother, the fact that the 
biological father views the transaction as begetting a child is irrelevant. Be­
cause money changes hands, neither sperm donor nor surrogate may claim 
constitutional privacy protection against state interference. 
B. THE NEED FOR CAREFUL ATTRIB UTION 
Where do these reflections leave us? Doe v. Kelley called upon constitu­
tional privacy rights to limit state interference with good samaritan surro­
gacy, but did not indicate precisely whose privacy right does the limiting. 102 
The court had no practical reason to dispel the troubling ambiguity, since it 
did not need to specify whose privacy rights limit state action to resolve the 
dispute between the adverse government and private parties to the litigation. 
The government defendant's interest was in having state adoption laws held 
applicable to surrogacy transactions. Its sole concern was that no plaintiff 's  
privacy right be declared an obstacle to extending the adoption statutes. The 
private plaintiffs' interest was in having the constitutional privacy of some 
plaintiff declared an obstacle. To them, it made no practical difference 
whether the privacy rights of Mary Roe alone, Doe alone, the Doe couple 
alone, or the Roe-Doe couple imposed the limitation they sought to establish. 
In other cases, however, courts will have good cause unambiguously and 
nonarbitrarily to pronounce whose privacy rights risk abridgement. One-
1 02. 1 06 Mich. App. 1 69, 1 73-74, 307 N.W.2d 438, 44 1 ( 1 98 1 ); see supra text accompanying 
notes 80-82. 
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sided and ambiguous ascription of  privacy rights in  the surrogacy context 
can mask the competing privacy interests which weaken a party's claim to be 
the rightful victor in a dispute. Courts relying upon privacy arguments must 
seek to acknowledge all the privacy claims, dispel all the ambiguity about 
who is asserting them, and then decide which claims to legitimate. This is 
especially important where, as in the Baby M case, a custody dispute arises 
between a surrogate mother and biological father, both of whom claim that 
their constitutional privacy rights-whether to procreative privacy or to the 
companionship of the child-entitle them to prevail. 
Paying careful attention to privacy right attribution can expose the weak­
ness in claims that particular parties are entitled to prevail in custody dis­
putes. This is not to say that custody disputes in surrogacy cases can be 
resolved by simple attributions of privacy. Privacy in the constitutional 
sense suggests freedom from state interference. But the concept of privacy 
provides no neat adjudicative principle for resolving natural parents' child 
custody disputes. Even the concept of family privacy points toward no reso­
lution, since it would beg important questions to select the childless couple 
rather than the surrogate and child as the relevant family whose privacy 
ought to be protected. Both sides seek public assistance to secure variously 
styled claims of privacy. 
It is no wonder, then, that the New Jersey courts in Baby M sought refuge 
in the maxim of the child's best interests and other traditional standards. 
This approach to the resolution of custody disputes in surrogacy cases is very 
appealing and probably best where lawful or unlawful surrogacy agreements 
have gone awry. But courts need to be clear about their grounds for embrac­
ing or rejecting privacy-based claims to child custody and the enforcement of 
surrogacy agreements. 
Ill. TH E  APPEAL TO PRIVACY: SOME LIMITATIONS 
It is time to consider the important matter of the contractual alienability of 
fundamental constitutional privacy rights. I do not intend to repeat the ef­
forts of others who have analyzed surrogacy agreements in detail from the 
point of view of contract law103 and inalienable rights. 1 04 I only want to 
highlight some respects in which alienability issues are a problem for consti­
tutional privacy arguments for and against commercial surrogacy. 
1 03 .  See Martin, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies Under Legislative Pro­
posals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601 ( 1984) (focusing on surrogacy and Kansas contract law). 
1 04. See Radin, supra note 1 5, at 1 928-36 (surrogacy and alienability); Note, R umplestiltskin 
Revisited, supra note 8 (same). 
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A. I S  A PROMISE A CONTRACT? 
As explained in Parts I and II,  a father's privacy claim against his child's 
natural but "surrogate" mother is plausible on one condition: if he assumes 
that she too has constitutional procreative and parental privacy rights and 
that in exercise of her privacy rights, she may commercially alienate, waive 
or otherwise abrogate the legal protection her privacy rights would normally 
afford. The father's argument must be that surrogates exercise their parental 
privacy rights by voluntarily promising to terminate parental rights in the 
children they are hired to carry. Out of respect for her right to exercise her 
privacy rights, her freedom of contract, and the father's equal rights and 
freedom, the surrogate's agreement to terminate parental rights should be 
validated and specifically enforced. So says the disappointed father. 
The basic argument of disappointed fathers is that "a-promise-is-a-con­
tract" :  intending to give up her parental rights and be bound by her word, 
the breaching surrogate mother freely made a promise to others who hired 
her in the exercise of their constitutional privacy rights. The surrogate en­
tered a contract. The contracting parties did not intend the key parental­
rights termination provisions to be revocable at will. In fairness, the surro­
gate is not to be permitted unilaterally to go back on her word by keeping the 
child. Why? Because she freely and knowingly promised; because she 
formed a contract; and because a court which refused to specifically enforce 
the contract in the face of her breach would abridge the constitutional pro­
creative privacy rights of the childless party or parties. 
"A-promise-is-a-contract" arguments in the context of surrogacy disputes 
attempt to marry the nineteenth-century will theory of contract 105 to the pri­
vacy jurisprudence of Griswold v. Con necticut. 106 This marriage could be ex­
pected to fail-for the former is an ailing geezer, the latter a winsome, but 
unformed ingenue. A court persuaded by so tenuous a union would force the 
surrogate to do what she once freely agreed to do for a childless couple that 
bought her services (the argument goes) in free exercise of its privacy rights 
and hers. 
This potential use of the coercive power of government is cause for con­
cern. Issues of contract enforceability and justice pose complexities even 
apart from questions of alienability. First, not all voluntary promises and 
written agreements are ipso facto legally enforceable contracts. Granted, 
business contracts are widely regulated and enforced. However, the mere 
105 .  "Will Theory" denotes the theory of contractual obligation and enforcement according to 
which voluntary agreements between rational persons ought to be enforced as expressions of a free 
will's intent to bind i tself. See generally P.S. ATJYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW 1 7-28 ( 1 98 1 )  
(explicating and criticizing will theory); Fridman, On the Nature of Contract, 1 7  VAL. U.L. REV. 
627-54 ( 1 983) (defending version of will theory); C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE ( 1 9 8 1 )  (same). 
1 06. 3 8 1  U.S. 479 ( 1 965). 
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fact that money is paid out and businesses have been set up to facilitate sur­
rogacy cannot be dispositive of whether surrogacy agreements should be en­
forced; at least not without begging important questions. Some reason must 
be given for treating surrogacy agreements as enforceable market instru­
ments between commercial players ratPer than unenforceable personal com­
mitments or family plans. Neither moral nor positive justice appears to 
require state enforcement of every serious promise. 107 Indeed, one of the 
most significant promises, the promise to marry, is freely revocable and 
largely unenforceable under present law.  
Not even the most ardent contemporary will theorists maintain that courts 
should always hold a person to her word, whatever the consequences for 
herself and others, simply because she knowingly and freely chose to bind 
herself. Of course, a contract can legally bind us now to do what we will not 
want to do later. But contracts are not sacred. They can be contrary to law 
and good public policy. 108 Hence, arguments that the rights and interests of 
others, and the surrogate's own inalienable rights and interests, pose limita­
tions on contract enforcement merit a concerned ear. Quite possibly, to force 
a woman to give up a child because she freely agreed to give it up prior to its 
birth is to bind her to her previously exercised free choice in the least appro­
priate of all contexts. 
Moreover, this compulsion protects the private choice of the biological fa­
ther at the expense of the reconsidered private choice of the surrogate 
mother. Perhaps this is as it should be; perhaps it is entirely fitting that the 
burden of temporal shifts in her preferences should be borne by the surro­
gate. In connection with his analysis of autonomy as the moral basis of con­
stitutional privacy, philosopher Joel Feinberg has defended the widespread 
belief that earlier voluntary decisions ought normally to take precedence over 
later conflicting ones. 109 Feinberg has admitted, however, that an exception 
might be appropriate in rare instances in which a person undergoes a funda­
mental change of character that makes her a morally different self. 1 1 0 In 
these instances the free and voluntary choices of the "earlier self" ought not 
bind the "later self."  Rejecting arguments suggesting that such metamor­
phoses are commonplace, Feinberg insisted that "[t]alk of the 'earlier self ' 
and the 'later self' is only useful facon de parler . . . . All of our ordinary 
notions of responsibility, as well as such basic moral practices as promise-
107.  Why not? See generally M. BAYLES, PRINCIPLES OF LAW: A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 1 70-
92 ( 1 987) (normative analysis of common law). 
1 08.  See id. at 1 86 ("The principle of collective good supports not using the law to enforce con­
tracts contrary to laws and policies promoting or protecting collective goods.") 
1 09 .  Feinberg, supra note I I , at 479. But see THE MULTIPLE SELF (J. Elster ed. 1986) (empiri­
cal and theoretical studies casting doubt on ordinary assumptions of human autonomy, rationality, 
consistency and the unity of self) .  
1 10. Feinberg, supra note I I , at 479. 
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making, presuppose a relation of personal identity between earlier and later 
stages of the same self. " 1 1 1 Feinberg may have been correct about "our" 
ordinary notions and moral practices. He may have been justified in offering 
then: up as a benchmark in normative reasoning about hard cases. However, 
the root issue raised by concern over the enforceability of surrogacy agree­
ments is not temporal shifts in preference but the logically prior one of 
whether persons should have the moral or legal power to make binding irrev­
ocable surrogacy agreements in the first place. 
Feinberg's discussion of fictional and hypothetical cases in which auton­
omy is voluntarily alienated carries implications for the root issue. 1 1 2 His 
discussion can be read as an argument for a liberal, anti-paternalistic pre­
sumption of validity for all voluntary agreements. But such a presumption 
settles nothing about the surrogate who changes her mind. Feinberg himself 
stressed that no person can be obligated by voluntary agreement to act con­
trary to her moral obligations and responsibilities to third parties. 1 1 3 More­
over, Feinberg suggested in passing that morality may sometimes require 
that the wretched individual who suffers greatly from the consequences of 
her voluntary agreements be released by her obligor, as a merciful act of 
humanity. 1 14 
Thus, crucial for the case of the surrogate who undergoes a change of 
heart is whether the surrogacy agreement violates the surrogate's obligation 
and responsibilities to third parties, such as to her child or to her community. 
And, if there is more to legal justice than a rights and obligations analysis of 
bilateral agreements can yield alone, the man who has a child by a recalci­
trant surrogate should perhaps be denied the benefit of legal enforcement, for 
the sake of mercy or another virtue. Without legal enforcement of contract 
provisions that prenatally terminate a surrogate's parental rights, natural 
mothers are mercifully spared the emotional agony of unwanted lost access 
to their children. 
But where in the surrogacy debate is the burden of persuasion? Relying on 
the fact that private parties have documented their agreement in a writing 
styled as a legally binding contract, should courts presume prima facie legal 
effect? Or should courts instead expect those who would enforce surrogacy 
agreements to shoulder the onus of providing an affirmative rationale for do­
ing so, acceptable to fair-minded skeptics? 
How one responds to these questions may reflect one's theory about the 
1 1 1 .  Id. 
1 1 2. !d. at 464-83 .  
1 1 3 .  Id. at  475 .  
1 14. !d. at  482-83 ("to let the loser [who has gambled irrevocably with his  own future in some 
way] sleep in his own bed or stew in his own juices-may be inhumane to such a degree that it 
cannot rightly be done"). 
1 786 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 76: 1 759 
origins of contractual obligation. Proponents of the view that freely entered 
private promises are the principal moral basis of contract law may be in­
clined to place the burden of persuasion on surrogacy's opponents. Indeed, 
this conception of where the burden lies is consistent with the conclusion 
that surrogacy contracts are the invalid products of economic duress rather 
than free will. 
The role of individual free will in the formation of legal obligation in mod­
ern life is easily exaggerated. 1 1 5 In a related vein, contract theorist P .S .  
Atiyah has argued that the will of a private individual cannot create a moral 
or legal obligation, except to the extent allowed by background entitlements 
prescribed by the social group. 1 1 6  Viewed in this light, the burden o f  persua­
sion may fall on surrogacy's proponents no less than on its detractors. With­
out the reqUisite background entitlements, "a-promise-is-a-contract" 
arguments, which stress the metaphors that minds met and free wills bound 
themselves in the exercise of privacy rights, carry no particular weight. 
Against this, one might respond that, as evidenced by existing moral convic­
tion and legal practice, "our" social group in fact prefers earlier autonomous 
choices to subsequent, contradictory ones. The resulting debate takes the 
question of whether a natural father is entitled to specifically enforce the 
surrogacy contract against a natural (surrogate) mother, and turns it into an 
empirical and interpretive inquiry. 
B. INALIENABLE RIGHTS 
Women have constitutional privacy rights protecting their interests in 
abortion and bearing and rearing children. It is necessary to consider 
whether justice permits alienation, especially commercial alienation, of some 
1 1 5 .  See Dawson, Economic Duress, 45 MICH. L.  REV. 253,  262-67 ( 1 947) (excessive emphasis 
on "the will" confused the undue influence doctrine). 
1 1 6. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW ( 1 98 1 ) .  There is much in this 
book with which to disagree, starting with Atiyah's moral relativism and conventionalism. 
Not only a positivist like Atiyah might suppose that individuals cannot create moral or legal 
obligations wholly on their own. A "natural law" theorist, for whom background rights are not 
conventional, could make a parallel argument that morality, and not the bare will of individuals, is 
the ultimate basis of contract law. 
Are the express promises of Mrs. Whitehead of no legal import? According to Atiyah the role of 
explicit promises, such as those Mrs. Whithead made to Mr. Stern, are to provide evidence of 
doubtful issues that bear on contractual obligation and to serve as admissions of her felt obligation. 
Jd. at 1 84-95 .  
O n  the most abstract level, Atiyah could b e  expected t o  view the Baby M courts a s  having had t o  
rely on what H.L.A. Hart called "rules o f  obligation" and "rules o f  recognition" t o  decide two 
concrete issues: first, whether Whitehead was entitled to make an irrevocable prenatal promise to 
give up a child, and, second, whether Stern was entitled to rely on Whitehead's promise. See 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77- 1 07 ( 1 96 1 )  (positivist theory of what law is and how legal 
obligation can be recognized). 
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of these important rights through irrevocable prenatal parental-rights termi­
nation agreements. 
The issue of the alienability of constitutional rights arose indirectly or not 
at all in the Baby M opinions. Chief Justice Wilentz did not address in gen­
eral terms the power of the individual to waive the protection of constitu­
tional privacy rights. However, his rulings regarding New Jersey law 
entailed, in effect, the proposition that parental rights are commercially ina­
lienable, but are otherwise alienable subject to a reserved right of revocation. 
Judge Sorkow addressed the fundamental privacy rights alienability issue 
more directly when he held that the provisions in the Whitehead-Stem surro­
gacy agreement whereby Whitehead promised not to abort were void under 
R oe v. Wade. Having found that the protections afforded by abortion pri­
vacy rights are commercially inalienable, it is a little surprising that Sorkow 
did not go a further step. Nevertheless, before concluding that surrogacy 
agreements are valid and enforceable, he did not anticipate and meet the 
argument that agreements promising to terminate parental rights are void as 
unlawful alienation of procreative and parental privacy rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. 1 1 7 
The surrogate who is fighting the judicial validation of a prenatal parental­
rights termination agreement has a complex response to "a-promise-is-a-con­
tract" arguments. This response did not explicitly appear in Baby M, but 
obviously bears on the adjudication of surrogacy disputes. The argument 
relies on the concept of inalienability 1 1 8 and has a strong and a weak version, 
both of which may help the case of a surrogate who changes her mind during 
or after pregnancy. 
The strong version is that the parental rights attendant to family and pro­
creative privacy rights are commercially inalienable-that is, they cannot be 
exchanged for money-because they are of fundamenta/ 1 19 importance to 
1 1 7 .  My conjecture is simply that he recognized no United States Supreme Court precedent that 
applied as clearly to parental rights waivers as he thought the abortion precedents applied. 
1 1 8 .  As explained by Margaret Jane Radin, "inalienability" is a central concept in our culture 
and "[y Jet there is no one sharp meaning for the term. "  Radin, supra note 1 5, at 1 850. Its denota­
tive meanings range from "nontransferable," to "nonsalable," to "nonrelinquishable by a 
rightholder," to "incapable of being lost at all ."  Id. at 1 853 .  In the discussion that follows, two 
senses of "inalienability" are most pertinent, namely "nonreliquishable by the rightholder" and 
"nonsalable." I am inclined to group myself among those who believe that parental rights should 
be deemed both relinquishable and nonsalable. As Radin points out, characterizing rights as non­
salable "expresses an aspiration for noncommodification." !d. at 1 855  n.24. The desire for noncom­
modification of children is one reason for opposing all forms of profitable surrogacy. The 
noncommodification of the womb is another. Yet I think it is largely unproblematic that parental 
rights are deemed transferable and relinquishable under noncommercial conditions, as when a teen­
ager gives up her child for adoption. Nor does it trouble me that parental rights can be lost, for 
example, by virtue of serious child abuse or persistent neglect. 
1 1 9. See Feinberg, supra note 1 1 , at 489 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.  3 1 9 ,  325 ( 1 937), 
and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 4 1 3  U.S. 49, 65 ( 1 973), for proposition that only fundamental 
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their possessors' best interests. 1 20 The strong version would support laws 
barring the satisfaction of women's own desires lawfully to hire themselves 
out as surrogates. The argument is thus paternalistic, though the paternal­
ism may be virtuous. 1 2 1 For their own good (as policy makers interpret it), 
or in the interest of values that underlie their own rights (again, as policy 
makers interpret them), all women are denied a liberty which some women 
want. 
The weak version is that a woman can commercially alienate parental 
rights, but not without reserving a postnatal opportunity to change her mind. 
To the extent that the aversion of childless couples to the risk of sudden 
revocation will reduce demand for surrogacy and thereby diminish opportu­
nities to work as surrogates, the weak version also bars the satisfaction of 
women's own desires to work as surrogates. The weak version inalienability 
argument also is, in a sense, paternalistic. 
The strong version or weak version argument, if convincing, could be uti­
lized successfully by the regretful surrogate who discovers that she would 
very much like to mother a child she had previously agreed to give up. If  the 
weak version inalienability argument is correct, the statutory right to a post­
natal period of reconsideration guaranteed by the adoption laws of New 
Jersey and most other states is also a right of constitutional proportions. 
Is either the strong version or weak version inalienability argument plausi­
ble? Should the implicit paternalism of these arguments be troubling? To 
trace an answer, it is necessary to focus on a particular normative conception 
of alienability. 
Diana T. Meyers has argued that inalienable rights include these four: 
The right to life, the right to personal liberty, the right not to suffer gratui-
liberties constitutionally protected). According to Feinberg, "it is not simply by virtue of being 
primarily self-regarding that decisions involving marital sex and family planning fall  within the 
zone of constitutional privacy . . . .  Rather, the court . . .  has circumscribed as 'private' those deci­
sions that involve the most basic of self-regarding decisions." I d. 
1 20. The strongest inalienability argument would maintain that a woman cannot alienate her 
parental rights at all-not even when she expects no monetary compensation. This would amount 
to an argument even against non-commercial voluntary adoption. 
1 2 1 .  A paternalistic interference with liberty can be morally justified, morally unjustified, or 
morally obligatory, depending upon the circumstances. By "paternalistic interference" I mean any 
deliberate action undertaken for reasons referring to the presumed good, well-being, or better inter­
est of the subject of paternalism, sometimes without his or her consent. One would be morally 
justified, if not obligated, in stopping a madman from swimming in an icy lake. However, I find no 
difficulty in failing to stop an experienced cold water swimmer who one knows to be sane and aware 
of the risks of practicing in an icy lake. 
Mary Beth Whitehead (and her former husband) brought a suit against the New York clinic that 
arranged the Baby M contract, alleging that it had failed to exercise proper care in  selecting her to 
serve as a surrogate. The lawsuit settled. L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at 2, col. 3 .  One way to 
understand the claim that Whitehead settled is as a plea for obligatory paternalism even in the face 
of an unyielding and ostensibly unflappable would-be surrogate. 
1 98 8] PRIVACY, SURROGACY, AND BAB Y  M 1 789 
taus pain, and the right to satisfaction of basic needs such as food, water, 
clothing, shelter, and medical care needed for survival. 1 22 The alienability of 
modes of personal liberty most concern us here. According to Meyers, to say 
that a right is inalienable is to say that it protects prerogatives essential to the 
security of free and responsible moral agents. There can be no obligation to 
give up or voluntarily renounce such rights. 1 23 Moreover, an inalienable 
right cannot be renounced; individuals cannot "dispense with the control 
over their lives which this [kind of] right would afford. " 1 24 
Adapting Meyers's moral theoretic conceptions to constitutional law, we 
can see why freedom of contract should not include the freedom to bargain 
away certain constitutional rights. They are understood as being inalienable, 
in the interest of personal security. One should not be able to contract away, 
for example, the protection of vital personal liberties guaranteed by the thir­
teenth and fourteenth amendments. 
The recalcitrant surrogate's inalienability argument is premised on the 
commercial inalienability of parental rights that are implied by a general con­
stitutional right of family and procreative privacy. Parental rights plausibly 
can be numbered among inalienable rights because they are a form of liberty 
linked to personal security. The surrogate's strong version inalienability ar­
gument is that her own constitutional privacy prevents her from entering a 
valid and enforceable commercial surrogacy contract. The surrogate's weak 
version inalienability argument is that her own constitutionally protected pri­
vacy rights are tied to essential personal liberty in such a way that they can­
not be given up. Such privacy rights are construed to include both the right 
to terminate parental rights and the fullest opportunity for reflection about 
terminating parental rights consistent with the inalienable rights of others. 1 2 5 
Hence, the surrogate who agrees prior to conception or childbirth to termi­
nate parental rights upon the birth of a child simply lacks the moral and legal 
power to bind herself to such an agreement. 
Obviously, this calls for a close analysis of the bases of inalienability claims 
in the surrogacy context. In the wake of Griswold and Roe, the respects in 
which values of personal security and liberty are at stake in a woman's deci-
1 22. D. MEYERS, INALIENABLE RIGHTS 53 ( 1 985) (philosophical account of natural and inalien­
able rights). 
1 23 .  !d. at 3 1 -34. Meyers argued that renunciation of the inalienable moral rights that make our 
lives secure would render the institution of morality self-defeating. Therefore, inalienable rights 
must be understood to impose obligations of self-restraint on right-holders. Holders of inalienable 
rights thus lack moral powers of waiver or other voluntary renunciation. See generally Note, Rum­
pelstiflskin Revisited. supra note 8,  at 1 94 1 - 1 949 (assessing competing theories of inalienability and 
defending rights central to personhood as inalienable). 
1 24. D. MEYERS, supra note 1 22, at 1 5 .  
1 25 .  Those individuals who conceivably have inalienable rights that would constrain the surro­
gate's right to change her mind surely include the surrogate-born child. But this assumes that there 
is an inalienable right to a stable environment soon after birth. 
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sion to abort have been well-articulated. Feminists have helped to provide a 
vocabulary of useful phrases to convey complex conceptions of what is at 
stake: free choice, self-determination, and control over one's own body. The 
respects in which values of personal security and liberty are at stake in a 
women's reconsidered choice to mother a child she has carried have not been 
well articulated. Legal theorists are unpracticed at serious, polemical de­
fenses of "natural" motherhood-the kind of defenses that do not rely upon 
platitude, sentimentality, or sex-role stereotyping. 
This is not to suggest that the value of mothering one's own child is more 
mysterious or ineffable than other exalted human experiences. Until re­
cently, "natural" motherhood needed no serious defense. 1 26 For more than a 
century in the United States, it has been widely presumed that mothering 
one's own child is both a right and a duty. It appears that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court had its eyes on "the child's best interests" but also the rights 
of natural motherhood when it chided the lower court for separating Baby M 
from her natural mother during the pendency of custody litigation. 1 27 
A woman's security may be tied to the fate of her offspring in at least two 
distinct and evident ways. First, her security can be undermined by the feel­
ing that she has lost control of a vulnerable being whom she has helped cre­
ate and set loose into the world. A woman may come to regard her 
voluntary loss of control as a failure of responsibility and as deeply regretta­
ble. Indeed, one reason the abortion right is so important to women is that 
their sense of responsibility often dictates that they should not carry a child 
to term unless they personally have the psychological and financial resources 
to care for it. Surrogate parenting is possible only to the extent that women 
are substantially free of the feelings of personal responsibility for their 
children. 
Second, women often identify strongly with their children. This sense of 
identity can stem from awareness of the pi1ysical connection that character­
izes the latter stages of pregnancy. It also can stem from knowledge of a 
genetic link. By virtue of biological ties, a woman may view her child as her 
link with the past, a part of her family, and her stake in the future. 1 28 
Because women's security can be so tied to the fate of their offspring, there 
is at least one good reason to treat parental privacy rights as commercially 
inalienable. A more permissive rule, one that allowed parental rights to be 
126. Poor and minority women have been subject to criticism from middle-class moralists who 
have questioned their fitness for the role of motherhood. See L. BANNER, supra note 55 ,  at 1 03 
(early efforts by black women's organization to challenge view that black women "naturally 
promiscuous"). 
127.  Baby M, 11, 109 N.J. at 466, 537 A.2d at 1 263 .  
128 .  Indeed, this  keen desire for biological kin is  what Richard Stern said led him to seek the 
help of surrogate Mary Beth Whitehead. !d. at 8 .  
1 988] PRIVACY, SURROGACY, AND BAB Y  M 179 1 
commercially alienated but subject to revocation as a matter of law, would 
have an analogous justification. This more permissive rule would preserve 
surrogacy as an option, at least nominally. 
If the prenatal parental-rights termination provisions of surrogacy agree­
ments are void as ineffective waivers of inalienable rights, the existence of 
surrogacy agreements provides no privacy grounds for awarding a disputed 
child to its biological father. Principles of estoppel and detrimental reliance 
derived from the common law of contracts have no normative power in the 
face of fundamental and inalienable privacy rights protecting the surrogate's 
parental status. 1 29 Despite her "breach" and the father's "good faith" and 
"reliance," her custody claims equal his. 
Of course, whether commercial surrogacy ought to be a lawful option is an 
inquiry that the analysis of privacy claims only begins to answer. Inalienabil­
ity rules are justified to the extent that they discourage the creation of mone­
tary incentives for women to do what their basic well-being overwhelmingly 
demands that they do not do: prenatally promise, without recourse, to give 
up a child they may later want very much to keep. 
My proposed account of why parental rights should be treated as inaliena­
ble, does not force us to conclude that women's rights to choose medically 
safe abortion or sterilization should be governmentally restricted for their 
own good-to give them opportunities to change their minds about mother­
hood. Issues of personal security and identity do not arise as acutely and 
concretely for contemporary American women choosing first trimester abor­
tion or sterilization as they do for women who have actually carried and 
given birth to a child. The alienability restrictions I have described for surro­
gacy are motivated by the greater likelihood and severity of real and, in some 
respects, unique harms risked by surrogates. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Neither courts, lawyers, nor legal commentators have succeeded in persua­
sively setting out a privacy case for surrogacy. Sorkow's Baby M opinion 
made much of the procreative privacy of childless married men and their 
spouses. It insisted that courts must respect privacy in the adjudication of 
surrogacy agreements and child custody disputes. Sorkow's Baby M opinion 
implied that if a would-be surrogate wants the right to change her mind and 
she is not provided with such a right by statute, then she must bargain for it. 
As the New Jersey Supreme Court would correctly point out, the "childless 
couple" oriented, "privacy right" based contract validation and enforcement 
policy urged by Judge Sorkow failed to accord equal deference to the procre-
129. But see Coleman, supra note 8, at 100 (surrogate agreement may work estoppel against 
natural mother). 
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ative and parental privacy of the surrogate. As I have pointed out here, both 
Baby M opinions skirted the difficult question of the alienability of the consti­
tutional privacy rights they invoked. 
Baby M did not forge the needed link between privacy rights in procrea­
tion and families, on the one hand, and reproductive pacts with strangers on 
the other. Neither of the two Baby M courts grappled with the issues of 
alienability and inalienability that cloud ready understanding of what consti­
tutional privacy should require. For this reason, Baby M did not much ad­
vance public understanding of whether those of us who have been unlucky in 
the natural lottery should be authorized to create incentives that tempt 
others to vend procreative capacities and fundamental parental rights. 
Surrogacy arrangements may provide some men the only realistic means 
of having a biologically related child. They may provide some women the 
only realistic hope to mother a child. They may make marriages happier by 
giving couples their best shot at normalcy. Private commercial surrogacy 
arrangements may be necessary to create incentives for significant numbers 
of women to agree to conceive and carry children that they understand they 
must surrender. These facts offer bare utilitarian support for the practice of 
surrogacy. But they do not plainly make it a good and just idea. 
I 
